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With the publication of the whole series of his lectures at Collège de France, Foucault’s theo-
retical and political experience in the 1980s has become one of the major focuses of critical in-
vestigation. As is clearly explained in the short introduction by Sandro Chignola, the authors 
of the essays composing this carefully crafted edited volume share a common take on this pe-
riod of Foucault’s philosophical production, which can be articulated along two fundamental 
claims: on the one hand, his late ethical inquiries into the ancient and Christian worlds are re-
garded as a change of perspective that brings to light the aim of his philosophical enterprise as 
a whole, namely, a practice of critique as historical problematization of the limits that shape 
our ways of thinking and acting in the present. On the other hand, by tracing the source of 
many of the current misunderstandings in the view of Foucault as a philosopher obsessed 
with power, the authors see in his late notion of “governmentality” the way Foucault chooses 
to dispose such an obsession in order to strategically analyze the antagonistic relations be-
tween freedom and deployments of seizure in their historical contingency. Bearing this back-
ground in mind, I shall show that La forza del vero has the distinctive merit to examine a cluster 
of problematics drawing a still little-known trajectory of Foucault’s thought, according to 
which his well-known Greco-Latin “trip”1 should not be understood as a consolatory disen-
gagement from politics but rather as a profound radicalization of the task “to refuse what we 
are,”2 namely to identify resources and tools for courageously inventing alternatives to the 
forms of modern power. To this end, given the heterogeneity of the themes tackled, I shall 
proceed by reviewing each of the essays in turn, while at the same time affording a possible 
line of reading that connects them to one another.  
The collection opens with an essay by Frédéric Gros dedicated to “The Treatises on 
Marriage and the Question of the Sexualisation of Eros in Subjectivity and Truth.” Although it 
finds its full-fledge account only in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Gros cogently argues that 
Foucault’s 1981 lectures are already organized around the irreducible distinction he draws be-
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tween the ancient idea of bios as a material to be shaped through a specific set of techniques, 
and the mode of subjectivation proper to the Christian hermeneutics of desire. Indeed, where-
as Christianity comes to define a framework of obedience based on the confession of one’s 
own hidden desires and the redeeming conversion towards a transcendent truth, the ancient 
wisdom of bios points to modalities of experience characterized by the ethical striving towards 
“immanent goals,” which can only be attained through a laborious work of transformation 
carried out by the self upon itself (21). However, Subjectivity and Truth is not just a mere pre-
view of the themes developed in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Rather, by exploring the artic-
ulated sexual experience of the ancient subject, it ends up representing a further step in the ar-
chaeo-genealogical reconstruction of the division between the ancient styles of life and the 
Christian subject. As Gros clarifies, this distinction stems from a “rift internal to antiquity it-
self,” namely from the difference between the classical Greek ethos and a Roman one which 
takes shape in the stoicism of the imperial age (22). While in the Greek regime the question of 
the truth of eros is completely desexualized and the mastery of one’s pleasures (aphrodisia) is 
connected to one’s status as socio-political agent, for Foucault the Hellenistic and Roman gen-
eralized appeal to heterosexual marriage determines a progressive synthesis of these two 
poles followed by the consequent erotization of sexual pleasure, whereby the couple relation-
ship becomes the structure of veridiction of “a first and pagan hermeneutics of desire” (29). In 
this sense, rejecting the common impression of a monolithic fascination, Gros’ detailed analy-
sis of Foucault’s 1981 still untranslated lectures provides a far more nuanced picture of Fou-
cault’s position with regard to ancient ethics, thus helping us account for the historical chang-
es in the constitution of the subject that have “led us up to the modern concept of the self.”3 
For Foucault, then, there is a fundamental ambivalence in Greco-Latin stoicism: on the 
one hand, it represents an anticipation of the colonization of the ancient techniques of the self 
by the normalizing morality of Christianity. On the other, as he explains in 1982, it epitomises 
a certain culture of the self that finds in the moral theories of the 16th century – particularly in 
the work of Montaigne – an unexpected moment of renovation.4 As its title “‘Techne tou biou’; 
Foucault after Montaigne” suggests, the bulk of Paolo Slongo’s contribution consists exactly in 
providing a thorough examination of this renewal, focusing especially on the affinities be-
tween Montaigne’s notion of franchise (frank-spokeness) and Foucault’s account of parrhesia. 
To this end, two elements appear as crucial: firstly, Slongo argues that the displacement Socra-
tes’ parrhesiastic mode of living operates with respect to the constituted order of the communi-
ty represents the common point of reference for both the resisting practice of franchise of Mon-
taigne’s Essays and for the critical, ethopoietic attitude of Foucault’s own philosophical enter-
prise (80-90). Secondly, although he blurs Foucault’s shift from the war-like schema of power 
to the notion of government in the 1970s, Slongo rightly contends that Foucault’s late concep-
tualisation of “agonistic” processes of subjectivation marks the definitive dismissal of the 
model of Law in favour of an “ethics of distance” based on a constant, perfectionist negotia-
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tion with moral codes (96). As Slongo concludes, then, in accordance with Montaigne’s reflec-
tions, Foucault’s parrhesiastic subject is not the Kantian subject of the moral Law but rather the 
Nietzschean subject as an instance of valorization, i.e. the subject of askesis capable of coura-
geously turning truth into the ethical force of a self-fashioning practice of freedom. 
The theme of askesis represents one of the most fruitful theoretical nodes Sandro Chi-
gnola refers to in his attempt to reveal the startling consonances between Foucault’s late ethi-
cal investigations and Weber’s thought. After identifying the common matrix of Foucault’s his-
torie fiction and Weber’s method of ideal types in Nietzsche’s perspectivism – whereby the his-
torical problematization of our present operates a selective, partisan reconstruction of past 
singular events in order to open up displacing and transformative possibilities in the future 
(47-57) –, in the second section of his essay “‘Phantasiebildern’/ ‘historie fiction’; Weber, Fou-
cault” Chignola detects in Weber’s account of the protestant Lebensführung the theoretical cata-
lyst of Foucault’s later inquiries into the ancient practices of subjectivation. Indeed, whereas in 
The Government of the Living Foucault still concentrates his attention on the regime of obedi-
ence defined by the juridico-confessional technologies of Christian monasticism,5 his 1982 ex-
amination of the subjectivizing techniques of veridiction of the stoic askesis clearly resonates 
with Weber’s portray of puritan asceticism as a rational and immanent “counter-conduct 
against pastoral power” (67). In this respect, as Chignola clarifies, both the protestant ethics 
and the spiritual exercises of stoicism do not point to a form of sacrificial renunciation, but ra-
ther to “practices of constant test of the degree of self-mastery and self-government that con-
stitute the subject by decentring self-reflection from the paradigm of self-consciousness” (69). 
More generally, therefore, Chignola’s meticulous analysis of Foucault’s convergence with We-
ber brings to light the crucial role played by the “discovery” of the techniques of the self not 
only in Foucault’s reformulation of power in terms of the elliptic relationship of governmen-
tality, but also in his elaboration of “an ethics of dedication and commitment” (64), which 
seems to find in the Greek notion of parrhesia its seminal formulation.  
In 1983 Foucault recognizes that the archaeology of this notion goes much further back 
than its ethical configuration in stoicism. Indeed, parrhesia’s original context of emergence is 
represented by the political constitution of the Athenian democracy (politeia), within which the 
exercise of parrhesia comes to depend on the equal right of every citizen to speak in front of the 
public assembly (isegoria).6 However, according to Foucault’s detailed analysis of Euripides’ 
tragedy Ion, isegoria would be just one of the two indispensable criteria for parrhesia to occur. 
The second one should be traced in the condition of autochthony, according to which only a 
person whose parents are born in Athens can effectively practice parrhesia, thus fully enjoying 
her citizenship rights.7 Now, through a compelling re-examination of Euripides’ tragedy, the 
aim of Gaetano Rametta’s essay (“Autochthony and parrhesia; Foucault as a reader of Ion”), is 
to problematize Foucault’s interpretation by questioning exactly this connection between par-
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rhesia and autochthony. Here, I shall limit myself to the last part of Rametta’s essay, where he 
investigates the crucial consequences of Athena’s command to conceal from Xuto the finally 
recognized descent of Ion from Creusa. According to his argument, far from confirming the 
indissoluble knot between autochthony and parrhesia – as Foucault suggests –, what the im-
posed secret shows is that parrhesia ends up “untying itself from autochthony” (129), whereby, 
as parrhesiastes, Ion remains the son of a stranger in the eyes of his fellow citizens. Hence, as 
Rametta concludes, Ion appears essentially as a reformist figure, whose role consists in no 
longer connecting the rights of citizenship to the criterion of autochthony but rather to “poli-
tics as the exercise of freedom” (131), i.e. to the antagonistic dimension of democracy as a par-
rhesiastic game.  
The developments of Foucault’s account of parrhesia are at the centre of Pierpaolo 
Cesaroni’s contribution entitled “Truth and Life; Philosophy in The Courage of the Truth.” After 
providing a lengthy but effective exposition of Foucault’s treatment of this notion in his very 
last course at Collège the France, Cesaroni dwells on the difference Foucault draws between 
the Socratic-Platonic version and the Cynic formulation of ethical parrhesia. In particular, in-
stead of reducing such discrepancy to the opposition between the metaphysical call for “the 
projection of one’s own self into an other world” (153) and the immanence of the cynic idea of 
the manifestation of the truth in one’s own life, Cesaroni remarks that for Foucault these forms 
of parrhesia also represent “two quite different […] stylistics,”8 two divergent modes of think-
ing about life. On the one hand, in Platonic parrhesia the truth that reveals itself in life’s ethical 
differentiation is the truth of the soul turned towards justice and the Good, a truth that – albeit 
not external to this world – transcends it by giving it a well-defined order. On the other hand, 
the truth embodied in Cynic parrhesia is “the truth of life itself,” whereby Cynic parrhesia aims 
not at Plato’s “just life” but rather at a paradoxical “animal life” deprived of any transcendent 
principle of order (155). Although his argument becomes rather blurred, Cesaroni’s paper is to 
be praised for his attempt to help the reader understand this problematic division through the 
appeal to other texts, such as Foucault’s posthumously published essay on Canguilhem enti-
tled “La vie: l’expérience et la science.”9 Here the alternative Foucault establishes between the 
idea of organism and Canguilhem’s reference to the biological notions of “information” and 
“error” parallels his own distinction between Platonic and Cynic parrhesia: indeed, whereas 
the reductio ad unum inherent in the shaping power of the transcendent principle governing 
Platonic parrhesia reproduces the well-articulated totality of the organic structure of the living, 
Cynic parrhesia can be seen as the embodied expression of the idea of thought as “the reply life 
gives to its aleatory dimension”10 thus representing the enabling condition of the problematiz-
ing activity of thought itself, i.e. the acquisition of the critical distance necessary to engage “in 
the transformation of the current modes of life and in the creation of new forms of subjectivi-
ty” (160).  
                                                        
8 Foucault, The Courage of the Truth, 255.  
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In this sense, as Judith Revel argues in her essay “Strolls, Small Excursuses and Histori-
cal Regimes,” Foucault astonishingly ends up describing Cynic parrhesia as a trans-historical 
attitude, as an ideal-type profile that traverses the entire history of the West.11 However, as 
Revel emphasises, this trans-historical configuration appears at odds with the common view 
of Foucault as a philosopher only concerned with archaeo-genealogical periodizations reveal-
ing the discontinuities that mark the emergence of different regimes of truth in the course of 
history (168). Now, in order to solve this tension, Revel provides an insightful examination of 
the two commentaries Foucault devotes to Kant’s text Was ist Aufklärung? According to Fou-
cault’s reading, Enlightenment designates not merely a historical period, but also a distinctive 
ethos, namely a critical attitude characterized by a specific relationship to its own actuality.12 
Consequently, such an attitude comes to define a third form of philosophical interrogation, 
which points to “the voluntary experimentation of lines of conduct and modes of life” capable 
of introducing a difference between our present and our actuality, i.e. between what we are 
and what we might potentially become (178). Far from displacing the archaeology of past epis-
temes and the genealogy of our present, therefore, Revel proposes a vitalistic reading of this 
inventive attitude, according to which the latter opens history onto its own virtual surplus, 
thereby configuring itself as “an ethics of freedom and transformation” (179) intrinsically ori-
ented to the future. 
In conclusion, through an original blend of historiographic analysis and critical inquiry, 
Cesaroni’s and Chignola’s La forza del vero provides the primarily academic audience with a 
much welcomed, fresh new look on the still largely unexplored series of Foucault’s 1980s lec-
tures at Collège de France, which increases the need for Anglophone publishers to translate 
more of the continental work produced on Foucault. Avoiding the fixation of an interpretative 
canon, the result is a composite picture of Foucault’s long detour through the ancient world, 
according to which the latter appears as the perspective guiding not only his reflections on (or 
better with) authors like Montaigne, Kant, Weber, and Canguilhem, but also his call for a new 
politics of truth, i.e. a politics of the governed as “the risky occasion for the reinvention of our 
relationship with ourselves and with others” (12) outside the constraints of the present. In the 
wake of Foucault, La forza del vero presents an exciting and enriching collection of essays in 
support of this call.  
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